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This article evaluates Ulrich Beck’s cosmopolitan global politics. I argue that areas where 
Beck sees bases for communal and cosmopolitan politics are structured by power, 
inequality and conflict. Beck has a conflict perspective on local responses to globalisation 
but this is not carried through to his global politics. There are issues that need to be 
tackled at a global level but I argue that this will have to be done on the basis of 
conflicting interests, power and nation-states as much as through global cosmopolitanism 
and co-operation.  
 
  




Ulrich Beck argues for global cosmopolitan politics with a co-operative and consensual 
approach over state-based and conflictual politics with a ‘national outlook’. This article 
focuses on Beck’s books Cosmopolitan Vision (2006) and What is Globalisation? (2000) 
and associated articles (eg Beck, 2000a, Beck and Sznaider, 2006). It is relevant also to 
his books on Power in the Global Age (2005) and Europe (Beck and Grande 2007) and, 
in parts, to other advocacies of cosmopolitan politics (eg Held, 1995, Archibugi and Held 
1995, Kaldor 2003). I wish to argue that power, inequality and conflict, and a role for 
nations, are acknowledged by Beck but undermine his cosmopolitan outlook. 
 
Beck is important for his analyses of modernisation and the development of a ‘second 
modernity’. He has analysed this through studies of ecological problems and the growth 
of a risk society. The increase in risk is as much in consciousness as reality. 
Modernisation has brought insecurities, resulting not from natural processes but as the 
unintended side-effect of manufactured processes. Consciousness of these has brought 
greater reflexive modernisation, self-consciousness of risk, and this is what makes the 
second modernity distinctive from the first. Many of the problems that Beck mentions, 
such as ecological degradation, and the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs), require global solutions. Nation-states are not adequate for tackling such 
problems and what is needed is a system of global governance called cosmopolitan 
democracy. This is inclusive in the range of actors it involves. By giving them all a say it 
is equalising and it is envisaged that decisions will be made by dialogue and deliberation 
between the plural actors involved, both state and non-state. One of the things which 
makes cosmopolitanism work is common risk consciousness, shared across the world, 
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and universal ideas such as human rights. A sense of global citizenship and global values 
provides the social and cultural basis for global co-operation and democracy.  
 
For its advocates cosmopolitanism is possible because of developments of globalisation. 
Nation-states have been undermined by internal problems such as the privatisation of 
state assets, sub-national fragmentation, and the collapse of statist systems of 
communism. Two world wars and the threat of nuclear conflict in the cold war have 
made people opt for international frameworks that bring states together in co-operation 
and prevent the likelihood of conflict. The end of the cold war has shifted the world from 
a bipolar divide to one where world-wide structures and commonality are more possible. 
Problems to do with the environment, crime, terrorism, human rights, war, health and 
WMDs are global and require global responses. Global inequality and poverty are major 
problems. The world economy has been globalised by neoliberalism and capital mobility 
and is characterised by greater interdependence and instability. Fragmented systems for 
global governance and regulation of the economy need to be more unified. Transnational 
migration, communications and culture have led to a greater sense of transnational 
identity that could underpin global citizenship in a cosmopolitan democracy. Democracy 
is organised at national levels but important decisions have to be made globally where 
there are not mechanisms of accountability. So cosmopolitanism is partly about 
overcoming this democratic deficit and restoring democracy at levels where decision-
making has become more relevant. Ideas of state self-determination have given way to 
greater legitimacy for the mutual interference of states or supranational forces in states’ 
affairs, for instance in pursuit of human rights, what Beck calls a shift from international 
law to human rights. And cosmopolitan democracy is not a completely utopian idea 
because there are bases for global governance in existing IGOs, INGOs, regional 
organisations and even global social movements. What is being signalled here is a shift 
away from perspectives on world politics that suggest a realist world of competing states, 
imperialism or global neoliberalism to one of global governance along cosmopolitan 
democratic lines. (Baylis et al 2007 provide an introduction to perspectives on world 
politics).   
 
My arguments have a wider relevance to other authors’ work on globalisation and 
cosmopolitanism, such as those cited above. But this article concentrates on Beck to 
ensure a focused and more detailed analysis and to illuminate his influential perspective. 
My focus is on Beck’s most recent works on globalisation and cosmopolitanism. His 
previous works (Beck 1992, 1999) have been much discussed (eg see Mythen 2004; 
Rustin 1994). His more recent writings are influential and bring up key themes in his 
work, but have not been so carefully analysed yet. They also raise issues that are 
important in public debates, such as climate change, WMDs, and global poverty and 
development, whether global governance, neoliberalism or state politics are the best way 
to tackle these and whether cosmopolitanism or conflict are the most likely way they can 
be engaged with globally.  
 
Ecology, Capital and Civil Society: cosmopolitanism or conflict? 
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One instance where Beck justifies cosmopolitanism over a conflictual perspective is 
when he sees counter-cosmopolitanism as possible but not effective. The sociological 
inevitability of cosmopolitanism, he says, outweighs contradiction or conflict, for 
instance on the part of states – ‘the new globality cannot be reversed’ (Beck, 2000: 11, 
88). In Beck’s political prescriptions adversaries to cosmopolitanism and conflict are 
ruled out (2006: ch 3, 73-4, 117).  
 
‘The falling of leaves in autumn can’t be prevented by looking the other way, and 
certainly not by insisting that you hate winter … even the most radical anti-
cosmopolitanism can re-erect the old boundaries only in theory, not in reality’ 
(2006: 117). 
 
There is a role for conflict in Cosmopolitan Vision. Cosmopolitanism does not 
necessarily lead to cosmopolitan awareness (2006: 74) and Beck says that 
cosmopolitanism has adversaries. He focuses on the Sept 11th attackers. But he says that 
cosmopolitan reality is irreversible, and that it is cosmopolitan awareness rather than 
reality that is open to struggle. There is confusion about whether cosmopolitanism is a 
fact of awareness or reality. Beck sometimes says the former and sometimes the latter (eg 
2000: 10; 2006: 73, 87). But cosmopolitan reality appears irreversible even though anti-
cosmopolitan awareness is possible. Awareness and action do not have effectiveness in 
this model, and irreversible cosmopolitan reality overrules them.  
 
But this does not recognise the agency of actors in making cosmopolitanism and who can 
also reverse it. And it suggests that cosmopolitanism is an external reality that is not 
subject to agency and, that where contrary awareness exists, it is ineffectual and 
overridden. There is conflict here but not in the basic structure of cosmopolitanism or 
where it is going. Conflict is there but not essential to the structure and fortunes of 
cosmopolitanism and is overriden. Much of this article is about the tension between 
cosmopolitan co-operation and conflict and the tendency for the former to win out over 
the latter in Beck’s work.  
 
The combination of community and conflict and the tendency for the former to be 
preferred over the latter in Beck’s theory arises in his discussions of ecological problems 
and world risk community (2000: 38-42). Beck outlines how ecological destruction may 
lead to armed conflict over resources (such as water), military intervention to stop 
deforestation, and migration after ecological devastation which can trigger armed conflict 
(2000: 41, see also Hirst, 2001). World risk society (WRS) is put forward as an antidote 
to these sorts of conflicts. Beck argues that global ecological problems generate WRS as 
an unintended side-effect. This involves a common awareness of shared environmental 
problems which leads on to a cosmopolitan consciousness of community and shared fate:  
 
‘the fact that the threat knows no boundaries means that for the first time people 
will experience the common character of a destiny … it is arousing a 
cosmopolitan everyday consciousness which transcends even the boundaries 
between man, animal and plant. Threats create society, and global threats create 
global society’ (2000: 38. See also Archibugi 2004: 444-5).  
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It is desirable to have WRS and global cosmopolitan democracy to counter such 
problems. These are globally caused problems which if possible need to be counteracted 
by globally combined responses. Not many states will go it alone in dealing with them if 
they think they will have to bear the costs of this unsure of whether others will do the 
same. And the problems have such an effect and global pattern of causes that the 
combined action of many is needed to solve them. So responses to these problems need to 
be agreed transnationally. I agree with Beck’s emphasis on transnational politics and the 
desirability of a cosmopolitan outlook.  
 
But such a global consciousness is unlikely. One reason for doubt is the lack of empirical 
evidence for it. Powerful nations sometimes opt out of shared consciousness or action or 
make the problem worse. They put economic or national interests before ecological and 
common consciousness. In action on climate change and nuclear proliferation, for 
instance, powerful nations try to maintain their energy use and nuclear weapons whilst 
aiming to ensure others reduce theirs. And diverging economic interests and ideological 
approaches (from neoliberalism to more regulative approaches) across nation-states make 
agreement and collaboration unlikely.  
 
Politics and action on the problems that Beck outlines show power, inequality and 
conflict rather than common global consciousness. So it may be better not to pursue 
global solutions through consensus when the basis for politics is conflicting objectives 
and power inequalities that will undermine that. This need not imply negativity, inertia or 
cynicism but an alternative view of politics. What might be pursued globally could be: an 
understanding of the conflicts involved over, say, environmental issues; judgements on 
which sides certain economic interests, political objectives and sought outcomes lie; 
calculations about possibilities for alliances or multilateral (rather than global) 
agreements along such lines; and politics around such a view of conflict and alliances. 
This is an international politics, and can be in pursuit of cosmopolitan and humanitarian 
objectives, but based on conflict and alliances where they can be sought out and built 
rather than a hope for global common consciousness in a world divided by divergent 
economic interests and ideologies (see also Zolo 1997).  
 
Let us take Beck’s example of ecological risks. Solutions to conflicts over resources may 
be best sought not by negotiation at global levels where parties have divergent interests 
and geopolitical objectives. Instead they can be sought at multilateral levels with a 
smaller range of international actors involved where the range of conflicting interests and 
ideologies is reduced. Or actors can choose rather than pursuing global consensus in a 
context of entrenched divides, to make judgements about which sides in a conflict need 
their interests defending, and organising around alliances and multilateral interventions in 
support of those.  
 
In such areas there is often not a common consciousness – there are different 
interpretations of what causes the problem (eg how climate change is caused), different 
interests (eg in carrying on with carbon producing activities or reducing them), power 
inequalities (eg power in the hands of superpower states, corrupt states, or corporations 
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who profit from despoliation, and others less powerful, such as local communities, less 
powerful states, or non-corporate actors, including those who suffer as a result of climate 
change), and different ideologies with varying views on how best to solve such problems 
(from neoliberal to interventionist).  
 
So the ecological problems that Beck discusses underline limits to cosmopolitan 
democracy and WRS consciousness and bring to the fore conflicts in global politics. 
They show that resolutions at supranational level have to be sought multilaterally, and/or 
through struggles and conflicts as much as through common consciousness and political 
structures based around this. A conflict perspective suggests the need for alliances and 
multilateral action around sides in conflicts rather than aspirations to a commonality of 
interests.  
 
Beck is aware of conflicting interests but is optimistic about overcoming them. (Fine 
2006 and Archibugi 2004 also argue for continuing with cosmopolitanism despite the 
‘ambivalences’ in it). He argues that risk leads to communication and contexts for action 
between opposing parties – an involuntary democratisation, public debate and 
participation in decisions which otherwise evade public involvement (Beck, 2006a). But 
this egalitarian and democratic picture lacks a sense of power and interest differences in 
such interactions. In it conflicting interests are unravelled in public debate and 
democratisation. There is a communalist assumption that deliberation will overcome 
conflicting interests, rather than an analysis of the interests and of the conflicts between 
them. Another way of seeing it might be as a need for integrated cosmopolitanism, rather 
than a trend in that direction, and subject to conflict, rather than leading from conflict to 
integration. Where Beck discusses this issue in relation to transnational integration he 
outlines conflicts that can arise (2006: 23-4).  
 
One reason Beck is optimistic about conflict being ironed out and cosmopolitan 
communality being viable is that he has a positive view of the cosmopolitanism of capital 
and civil society (2000: 67-72). Capital is viewed in What is Globalisation? as having the 
potential to be globally compassionate. Beck says that winners from globalisation may 
have a conscience and not distribute their plenty to rich countries. He argues that 
compassion is becoming global and that while citizens continue to stay national the 
bourgeois behaves in a cosmopolitan way and will act beyond the national. Beck is 
saying that capital will be compassionate in its distribution of profits and that its 
compassion will not just be national but global.  
 
‘Whereas the citoyen is still trapped in the framework the national state. The 
bourgeois acts in a cosmopolitan manner – which means that when his democratic 
heart throbs, his action no longer has to obey the imperatives of national loyalty’ 
(2000: 67).  
 
A contestable assumption here is that corporations can be motivated by compassion 
rather than economic self-interest. This goes against economic self-interest models of the 
business world from right and left. Such perspectives see corporate global benevolence in 
connection with their economic interests. Oil companies like BP pursue a more green 
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path to attract consumers or because of dwindling oil reserves rather than because of a 
concern with climate change. So more cosmopolitan behaviour by capital will only be 
found where it meets corporate self-interests.  
 
Beck is also optimistic about the cosmopolitanism of global civil society. One example 
used to make the case for this is an anti-Shell campaign by Greenpeace (2000: 68-72). It 
is argued that this represents a ‘scene change’ from the politics of the first modernity to 
the cosmopolitanism of the second modernity. The campaign involved alliances of 
illegitimate and parliamentary forces and: 
 
‘comes close to the utopia of a cosmopolitan society which Kant outlined two 
hundred years ago in his Perpetual Peace .... It is a global nexus of responsibility 
in which individuals - and not only their representative organisations - can 
directly take part in political decisions. To be sure, this presupposed purchasing-
power and excludes all those who do not have any’ (2000: 70). 
 
I wish to raise three issues. Firstly, Beck has a tendency to rest significant claims on 
individual illustrations and this is the case here. Secondly, there is contrary evidence to 
suggest that individuals do not have a sense of social responsibility and act on it. 
Alongside ethical consumers, widespread egoistic consumer behaviour is behind 
environmental problems. Insofar as individuals do exercise social responsibility this has 
as often not had a major effect on big corporations as it has. Thirdly, as Beck notes, 
consumer responsibility is affected by purchasing power. The focus of his argument 
about civil society on consumer action limits its applicability. This undermines the 
suggestion of a ‘cosmopolitan society’ because, as he says, consumer power is exclusive 
and uneven.   
 
I have emphasised conflict as an important part of globalisation. Beck asks why conflict 
must dominate perspectives on globalisation and says that we should be able to see the 
community in it – ‘For while these gloomy prospects must not be covered up or glossed 
over, it seems to have gone unnoticed that glocalization also produces new kinds of 
“communality”’ (2000: 50-51). But examples given to counter conflict perspectives with 
evidence of community are ones in which conflict is embedded. A common pattern is 
reproduced here. Beck takes commonality and starts off from the point of view of finding 
community in it. This glosses over conflict (though sometimes acknowledging it) which 
starting out from a conflict perspective would show. 
 
Examples of global community that Beck gives include ‘Mickey Mouse and Coca-Cola 
through the symbolism of poisoned dying creatures (images of oil-soaked seagulls and 
baby seals) to the first signs of a world public sphere which, funnily enough, manifested 
themselves in the transnational Shell boycott’ (2000: 51). But the striking thing about 
such examples is that they show power, inequality and conflict more than community. 
These are not globally shared phenomena. Some of the consumer activities mentioned are 
more preponderant in richer countries amongst those who have the best access to media 
and western consumer products. Insofar as they reach a global extent, Mickey Mouse and 
Coca-Cola, for example, are products of American corporate media power, spread 
 7 
globally because of such power, which is not shared equally and which produces 
resistance, for instance in anti-globalisation movements and states, from France to Iran to 
Venezuela, that want to curb it or provide alternatives (see Kiely 2005).  
 
Images of oil poisoned creatures are given as examples of global community because of 
shared public antipathy to such phenomena. But the example is more complex and 
conflictual than this. It is contestable whether there is shared public consciousness about 
things like oil poisoned animals. Furthermore such creatures are poisoned by leaks of oil 
over which there are inequalities in access, use and ownership, power struggles (as far as 
war), and clashes between the needs of oil companies, consumers and environmental 
concerns. There are wider problems connected to the oil industry such as climate change, 
itself something that leads to political conflicts over how to resolve it and possibly 
resource wars over diminishing supplies of water and fertile land. Beneath the image of 
oil poisoned creatures and globally shared concern there lie power, inequalities and 
conflicts which belie the realism of an appeal to community.  
 
The transnational Shell boycott is also given as an example of global communalism. But 
it is a site of global conflict, between protesters and boycotters on one hand and the oil 
company and its interests on the other, and there are other tensions, for instance between 
local communities and the corporation. A public space and some degree of communal 
sentiment may be opened up but within the structure of a conflict over economic interests 
and diverging ideological objectives. Beck sees community because of a perspective 
which starts off to find a basis for politics in this. This glosses over relations of power, 
inequality and conflict which undermine global communalism and imply, instead, a role 
for multilateralism (rather than globalism) and a politics of conflict in the pursuit of 
cosmopolitan objectives.  
 
One reason Beck underestimates the potential for conflict to undermine global 
cosmopolitan democracy is that he conflates relations in world society with a lack of 
conflict. However inclusion and relations in world society may happen but involve 
conflict. This logic occurs in Beck’s critique of Zygmunt Bauman’s (1998) analysis of 
conflict at the global level (2000: 54-8). Beck says that qualifications should be made to 
Bauman’s argument that globalisation is leading to the polarisation of rich and poor 
globally. Beck argues that Bauman shows how the poor and rich are actually bound 
together, have a closeness and are all included in the second modernity. The poorer 
periphery and richer core parts of the world are included in each other and have 
relationships. It is impossible to exclude the poor from society as can be seen from their 
occupying of luxury streets in Rio. Beck says that Bauman does not explain why 
globalisation destroys community between the rich and the poor and that a cosmopolitan 
solidarity cannot be ruled out (2000: 58). In short, where Bauman sees polarisation and 
conflict Beck says there is community.  
 
‘Two points qualify Bauman’s important argument that globalization is leading to 
a polarization of rich and poor on a world scale … For at least in his perspective 
as observer, he binds together what he depicts as irrevocably disintegrated in 
trans-state world society: namely the framework, the minima moralia, which 
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make the poor appear as our poor, the rich as our rich … the formation of a 
“cosmopolitan solidarity” cannot be ruled out … world societies … create a new 
closeness between seemingly separate worlds … it is even questionable whether 
in the second modernity the cultural production of “possible lives” … allows any 
groups to be excluded … The first world is contained in the third and fourth 
worlds, just as the third and fourth are contained in the first … This new 
impossibility of excluding the poor can be seen in Rio, for example, where the 
homeless “occupy” luxury streets at nightfall’ (2000: 57-8).  
 
A specific example is used, at the end of this quote, rather than systematic evidence. As 
has been mentioned before Beck tends to rely on individual illustrations rather than 
systematic evidence to support general points. Furthermore the example is of the spatial 
inclusion of the poor in rich areas. But this does not show the poor occupying equivalent 
space as the rich – they are sleeping on the streets of rich areas not in the residencies. 
And this is spatial rather than social inclusion. Sharing geographical space is not the same 
as sharing the economic, social and political society or having comparable status within 
it.  
 
There are echoes here of Beck’s Durkheimian argument against migration (2000a: 92-4 
and 2006: 108-9), that the unskilled poor of the developing world and the skilled rich in 
developed countries, separated in the international division of labour, will be bound 
together in cosmopolitan solidarity because of their interdependence. Beck assumes 
community between the rich and poor on the basis of shared inclusion in the same society 
and interrelationships.  
 
‘we cannot exclude the possibility that national “non-solidarity” neoliberalism 
(globalism) could take a cosmopolitan turn. This could happen if solidarity with 
fellow nationals or fellow citizens were replaced by solidarity in the context of a 
global distribution of labour and wealth … New ways of sharing labour and 
wealth across borders – without migration – are emerging … a cosmopolitan 
distribution of labour and wealth could arise in the long run in which low-skilled 
jobs are exported from rich to poor countries: concomitantly jobs requiring higher 
qualifications would be sourced in countries with low population densities but 
highly skilled workforces’ (2006: 108-9). 
 
But membership of the same society and inclusion does not equate with lack of conflict. 
Groups can be members of a shared community and have mutually dependent 
relationships but on the basis of inequality, power differences and conflictual relations, 
with diverging interests. Data which shows trade and investment concentrated between 
rich countries (see Hirst and Thompson 1996, Dicken 2007) doesn’t suggest that the 
global rich and poor are part of the same community, or that if they are it is on the basis 
of great inequality.  
 
Beck acknowledges ‘conflict with each other in a variety of hybrid relationships’ (2000: 
58) and that shared relations can lead to conflict rather than community. But this 
qualification implies that it is wrong to cast doubt on Bauman’s conflictual rather than 
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community perspective. It is partly on the basis of his communal view of interdependent 
relations that Beck makes optimistic proposals for cosmopolitan democracy. In 
phenomena like world risk society he sees communities with shared risks and fates, but 
assumes on the basis of shared community the possibility of communal feelings rather 
than conflicts and struggles within that community. There is more of Durkheim’s organic 
solidarity here and less of Marx’s sociology of conflict.  
 
Beck says we are at a moment where nations have a choice between: a) a cosmopolitan 
regime which adapts to the new modernity so that new threats can be countered; or b) a 
return to a Hobbesian war of all against all in which military might replaces global law 
(2006: 125).  
 
He has said option (b) is of the first age and has been irreversibly left behind but here 
suggests it is a choice. This undermines the idea of there having been a paradigm shift to 
something irreversible.  
 
Beck seals off these two possibilities (a) and (b) from one another as an either/or 
question. His argument is for (a) over (b). An alternative prescription would be for 
attempts to solve global problems at a global level (a) but recognition that this will be 
structured by (b), conflict between groups such as states over the solutions, in which 
actors would be best off assessing where to take sides in the conflict rather than hoping 
for consensus. There is a false separation between global politics and the politics of 
conflict. The first, as Beck rightly argues, needs to be pursued, but within a context that 
understands it will be a matter of conflict and struggle between competing interests rather 
than one of consensus. 
 
Beck has faith in transnational politics to solve problems in an age where, for him, 
national politics can no longer do so. He is right that transnational forms have become 
more and more necessary. He argues, for instance, that the ‘globalised economy can only 
be regulated globally – only those who fight for regulation at the global level have the 
remotest chance of success’ (2006: 74). But this needs to be embedded in a conflict 
model of what fighting for regulation at a global level involves, via relations of power 
and inequality. There are different actors in the world economy – from states, rich or 
poor, to the World Bank to NGOs – varying ideologies about how to deal with the global 
economy – from neoliberal to regulatory – and states and other actors have different 
interests in how it should be run according to what would benefit them, from free trade, 
to fair trade, protectionism or regionalism. The cosmopolitan model leads to a consensus 
view of what it is possible to forge at a transnational level rather than a view of conflict 
and the uneven distribution of resources. Archibugi (2004: 452-3), for instance, sees 
cosmopolitanism in terms of agonism (competitive spirit) rather than antagonism. For 
him the conflict of the latter can be overcome. This leaves out contradictory interests and 
ideological demands that mean pursuing politics at transnational levels is as much about 
conflicts to be won by some over others as about agreements that can be achieved 
through a cosmopolitan coming together. So Beck is right to emphasise transnational 
politics as necessary, but there needs to be an emphasis not just on cosmopolitan 
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inclusion and agreement but also on conflict and the winning of battles in a situation of 
dissensus.  
 
This leads us back to classical sociology. Sociology from the ‘first age’ of modernity, 
from Marx and Weber, to the Frankfurt School and neo-Marxism and neo-Weberianism 
stressed conflict models of society and politics, often in opposition to consensus views. 
More recently sociologists of globalisation, such as Bauman (1998) and Crouch (2004), 
have continued in such traditions analysing the power and inequality underpinning 
transnational politics. Beck is stronger than Bauman in making suggestions for 
transnational politics. Bauman does not delve too far into such questions in his book on 
globalisation. But Bauman’s critique of inequality and conflicting interests, which, as we 
have seen, Beck discusses (2000: 54-8), could be infused into Beck’s politics. Crouch 
also has drawn attention to imbalances in power and transnationalism between classes 
which are accentuated by globalisation.  
 
A Conflict Model not Followed Through 
 
I have suggested that Beck is conscious of conflict in social relations but does not apply 
this to the basic structure of his analysis. This pattern happens in Beck’s critique of David 
Held’s (eg, 1995, 2000) model of cosmopolitan democracy (Beck, 2000: 94-5). Beck’s 
doubts about Held’s scheme could apply to his own theory and are an example of 
undermining contradictions which are not carried through. 
 
Beck outlines Held’s scheme of cosmopolitan democracy – global power networks, 
cosmopolitan democratic law, transnational parliaments and courts and individuals as 
citizens at different levels. While it is important to align politics with the transnational 
nature of problems and forces in the world, Held’s scheme is optimistic about what 
global fora can achieve, and it focuses on political institutions and relations, with less 
attention to the political economy that affects political institutions.  
 
Beck recognises these issues in Held’s work in a way which if applied to his theory 
would show problems with that also. Beck asks the question of whether ‘powers and 
tendencies’ would support or block Held’s cosmopolitan democracy, and raises the issue 
of how normative visions in the past have been linked to ‘imperialism, colonialism, two 
world wars, the Holocaust, the Stalinist gulag’. He hopes that Held’s normative vision 
will not be ‘torn apart’ by its own ‘contradictions and adversaries’. But he argues that ‘for 
social science and politics, hope is too little’ (2000: 95).  
 
Beck recognises that real powers and tendencies may undermine cosmopolitan 
democracy but does not apply this to his own cosmopolitan politics which is vulnerable 
to the same problem. Calling Held’s scheme a ‘picture book vision’ brings out its 
optimism and he argues that ‘hope is too little’, but these apply also to his cosmopolitan 
vision which is based on a hope that it is feasible and possible with less attention to its 
embeddedness in powers, conflicts and inequalities that affect its feasibility or could take 
it in directions which favour the interests of the powerful more than others. There is a 
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self-undermining aspect to Beck’s critique of Held. It applies to Beck’s theory as well as 
Held’s politics of cosmopolitan democracy.  
 
Problems for his analysis being brought up but not followed through arise in other areas 
too. Beck sees conflict as part of cosmopolitanism, specifically as part of ‘procedural 
universalism’ (2006: 59-61; also see 2006: 94). He says that violent disputes cannot be 
‘consensually resolved’ by the negative cosmopolitanism of intervention to stop them, 
they can only be pacified. He argues that cosmopolitanism ‘is another word for conflict, 
not consensus’ and that the ideal speech situation of Habermas needs to be given a 
‘realistic twist’ and developed as a conflict theory. Here it is suggested that the ‘realism’ 
in cosmopolitan realism points to embedding cosmopolitanism in a sociological rather 
than purely philosophical or normative perspective and that the former shows that 
cosmopolitanism is structured by conflict (see also Archibugi 2004: 457).  
 
However this approach is not followed through in his advocacy of cosmopolitan 
democracy. This aspires to agreement without an analysis of the economic and political 
interests involved which would show how cosmopolitanism is affected by conflict 
between them. The need for the latter is highlighted in Beck’s theory but not developed in 
his advocacy. This makes it hopeful about fair and accepted agreement without an 
analysis of the conflictual bases that make this problematic.  
 
Elsewhere Beck mentions the clash between normative or political cosmopolitanism as 
being between idealism on one hand and realpolitik on the other (2006: 44-7). The 
goodness of the good he says is not enough to make the case for cosmopolitanism. It 
must also be realistic, and an optimist of the cosmopolitan outlook can also be a pessimist 
of the cosmopolitan mission. He says that analysing the problems of cosmopolitanism 
involves looking at its ambiguities and ideological misuses. But this is not carried on with 
in a developed way. There is a tension here between a developed theory of human rights 
cosmopolitanism and an undeveloped mention of issues of power and misuse that could 
be involved in it. The latter is seen as an addition to the theory rather than as problematic 
for it.  
 
Beck rightly emphasises the empirical-analytical dimension and sociological 
cosmopolitanism but does not go on to look for problems with cosmopolitanism at this 
level in its economic, social and political underpinnings and the power, inequality and 
interests behind it. He talks of weaknesses of cosmopolitanism where it lacks a political 
theory behind its normative outlook, where empirical-analytical issues are not featured 
enough and where there are ambiguities in the cosmopolitanism of reality (2006: 46). But 
these approaches are not built into his prescriptions.   
 
Let us look at this in relation to the specific example of human rights cosmopolitanism. 
Beck mentions potential problems of a human rights regime and says that humanitarian 
intervention can lead to a proliferation of military conflicts and perpetual war rather than 
conflict regulation. But having mentioned realpolitik he does not follow this through and 
look at underlying economic and political power inequalities and how these feed into 
human rights cosmopolitanism. Human rights cosmopolitanism can be something that 
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western regimes powerful in military and other senses use when it suits their interest but 
do not when it does not (for example, in the cases of Guantanamo Bay and US reluctance 
to be involved in the International Criminal Court). This raises questions about how 
powerful states can define what is meant by human rights in such cases, dominate 
definitions of who are identified as being the culprits and where intervention is necessary, 
and can undermine the cosmopolitan system by partiality and a lack of following the 
same standards themselves. In this context human rights cosmopolitanism loses 
legitimacy in the eyes of those on the receiving end, or who are less equal in deciding its 
shape. Human rights cosmopolitanism is looked at by Beck as undermining nation-states 
and despotic rule, but not in the way that nation-states are behind it, can use it to increase 
power or spread their influence and as method for enforcing despotism.  
 
Beck rightly mentions that there are authorities who decide whether human rights are 
respected or violated, have the power to grant legitimacy and expose some places to 
military intervention (2006: 47). It has to be assumed he means entities such as the UN 
security council. It is not discussed whether the authority granters are states, or 
dominated by core states, and he does not analyse the power structures behind such 
authorities, their definitions of human rights, and their interests, though he says that the 
boundary lines and selectivities of human rights cosmopolitanism ‘conform to the logic 
of power’ (2006: 47). There is a tension here between a developed justification for 
cosmopolitanism and an undeveloped raising of some of the issues of power and interests 
behind it. The latter could undermine the former but this possibility is not carried 
through.  
 
So Beck could develop the qualifications he makes about power and conflict in global 
politics, that at present remain qualifications rather than structuring principles in his 
analysis. He could also model his consensual model of global politics on his more critical 
evaluation of domestic state responses to global neoliberalism, where there is a stronger 
sense of conflict, power and inequality (eg 2000: 1-8, 57-63, 118-9). 
 
Beck is more of a radical on the domestic impact of globalisation, in tune with his 
background in Germany. Here there has been a regulated social model, the social market, 
which is less in accordance with global neoliberalism than Anglo-Saxon capitalism is. 
Discussing the domestic impact of neoliberal globalisation on welfare, democracy and 
politics, Beck argues that global neoliberalism brings a recapture of power by 
corporations from the politics and welfare of the postwar settlement between labour and 
capital (2000: 1-8, see also Crouch 2004 on post-democracy). Their aim, he says, is to 
shunt state and labour out of the way to bring about a free market that can be exploited by 
capital for their own gain. The economy has grown, yet despite this unemployment has 
increased because the gains of growth have been creamed off into corporate profits with 
the downsizing of labour. Tax avoidance by big corporations has been made more 
possible by globalisation. Beck argues that the conflictual logic of capitalism has been re-
emerging while the state has been losing its power to pursue justice and mediate conflict 
(2000: 62). Owners in capitalism are increasing their profits, marginalising employees 
and the welfare state. Not only are the working class and welfare being undermined but 
also politics and democracy. Transnational corporations are mobile so eroding the chance 
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of democratic welfare states to mould society. They play off national states against one 
another, and states and labour are still organised at national levels while capital is 
organised transnationally (2000: 65). 
 
This attunement to power imbalances, conflicting interests and unequal benefits in the 
domestic impact of globalisation does not get transposed to analysis of politics at the 
global level. An understanding at the state level in which taxation, collectivism, a social 
model, and democracy are central is accompanied by a liberal and optimistic analysis at 
the global level where cosmopolitanism is proposed as a hopeful, most adequate and only 
viable, form of politics. Issues of power, inequality and conflicting interests are 
acknowledged as complications for this prescription, but not as structuring principles of 
politics in the way they are seen to be at the level of the local economic impacts of 
globalisation on class, welfare and politics. Radicalism and political economy locally are 
accompanied by liberal and consensual assumptions globally.  
 
This mismatch between conclusions concerning local or global levels is accompanied by 
a disjuncture also between what is said about economic and political dimensions. Beck is 
more critical about economic globalisation than political globalisation. Beck’s critique of 
economic globalisation (eg 2000: ch. 4) does not match with a greater utopianism about 
political globalisation. There could be more crossover of being critical across different 
areas and linkage of global politics back to the economic and the conflicts there.  
 
Beck argues that economic globalisation is often actually internationalisation because 
transnational trade, production and investment relations are restricted to certain parts of 
the world and within and between them – North America, Asia and Europe (2000: 120, 
see also Hirst and Thompson 1996). This demonstrates power and inequality in economic 
globalisation. But how this power and inequality and conflicting interests suffuse through 
global cosmopolitan politics is lost or is added as a qualification rather than a structuring 
principle which would undermine optimism about global cosmopolitanism.  
 
Critical analysis is applied at the economic level but less so at the political level, or is 
fundamental in the former while an add-on in the latter. And economic globalisation is 
separated out from other dimensions of globalisation so that they are analysed in 
abstraction from the way that they are affected by the economy. This may be an attempt 
to avoid narrowly economistic approaches but causes a loss of insight from the economy 
across to other dimensions.  
 
Beck analyses cosmopolitan democracy in terms of a consensus model but this is less the 
case in What is Globalisation? when focusing on globalisation economically where it 
impacts with politics at the level of the state or states (Beck 2000: introduction). Here 
globalisation is analysed as a process of neoliberal expansionism which involves 
conflicting interests between capital and other classes in society. Beck distinguishes 
neoliberal globalisation by calling it ‘globalism’ and contrasting it with broader concepts 
of ‘globalisation’ (a more processual idea) and ‘globality’ (or world society) (2000: 9-13, 
117-9). In doing this he sets up the possibility of looking at cosmopolitanism in these 
latter two concepts in a way that does not draw in so centrally the class conflict of 
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economic globalisation (or ‘globalism’). Economic neoliberal globalisation is separated 
conceptually from other forms of globalisation. Yet this is a false distinction because 
these economic class conflicts infuse the broader processes, ‘globality’ and 
‘globalisation’, too.  
 
A related issue concerns the state in global politics. Beck has a picture of power and the 
dominance of capital and of capital as having different interests to labour and the state. A 
logical response to this is for labour and state to be organised transnationally in 
cosmopolitan democracy to counteract capital at the global level at which it is organised. 
But this supposes that labour and state have similar interests which run contrary to capital 
and, organised politically at transnational levels, can counter capital. The reality is that 
states sometimes share ideologies with capital (eg neoliberalism) which go against state 
welfare. Beck assumes a social democratic perspective at the level of states organised in 
global democracy rather than a conflict between neoliberal and other ideologies and 
between states who are allied with transnational corporations and those that wish to 
constrain them. Global politics involves conflicts between ideologies and economic 
interests rather than convergence around social democratic and humanitarian norms. This 
issue about the role of the state globally leads into my concerns in the next and final 
section of this article, about the continuing role of the national outlook in global politics.  
 
The ‘National Outlook’ and Global Politics  
 
I have argued that power, inequality and conflict need to play more of a part in Beck’s 
analysis of global politics. I wish to argue also that there is too much pushing out of the 
national outlook in what is seen as a paradigm break to a more global and cosmopolitan 
order.  
 
Beck’s global democracy rests uneasily with the fact that nation-states are building 
blocks of global politics, and that there are differences of culture, ideology and economic 
interest along national and other lines. These undermine possibilities for negotiating 
global agreements. In an aside from his main arguments Beck says (2006: 47) that as long 
as there is no human rights cosmopolitanism via world government it is states that 
enforce it on other states, countries and regions. In short, human rights cosmopolitanism 
is a state-oriented business where there is no world government. Where there is world 
government it is, for reasons I have outlined, unlikely to operate in a communal way and 
likely to be marked by state power and conflicts.   
 
Beck is scathing about national, realist perspectives which emphasise US power, oil, 
national interests, hegemony, and imperialism over human rights or terror as motivations 
for US global interventionism, and which focus on the US as violating international law 
and having the status of a war criminal. For example he dismisses explanations of the war 
in Iraq which highlight oil interests as stuck within a national-imperialist view which will 
not accept a cosmopolitan humanitarian view of US intentions and a global cosmopolitan 
view of the world as one that has changed (2006: 137, 156-162).  
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‘The national outlook …. fails because it cannot comprehend the new logic of 
power in global society. Anyone who believes that the global policeman NATO 
or the USA is merely pretending to play the role of global policeman while really 
pursuing American economic and geopolitical power interests in the powder keg 
of the Balkans or the Arab world not only misunderstands the situation but also 
overlooks the extent to which the politics of human rights (like the imposition of 
“free markets”) has become the civil religion, the faith of the United States itself 
… a new kind of postnational politics of military humanism is emerging’ (2006: 
137).  
 
This alternative view in which power is subordinated to global responsibility is 
contestable. It is a striking view given the countervailing literature and the inconsistency 
of the US in pursuing human rights – for instance in Guantanamo Bay, relations with 
China, in its policy on international justice, and in past interventions in democratic 
politics in Latin America and elsewhere. US interventions globally, or the choice about 
where to make them, have been affected by whether they are in US geo-political interests 
and are not in line with a consistent pursuit of human rights that this being their ‘religion’ 
would show.  
 
Beck says that the defence of human rights overseas can co-exist with geostrategic, 
economic and hegemonic interests. This may be so in theory but in practice the latter has 
often overridden the former in US foreign policy. It has often been more the case that 
human rights are used as a legitimation of geostrategic interest and pursued when in such 
interests, but not pursued (for example, in relation to China or Guantanamo Bay), or even 
gone against, when not.  
 
There is a lack of referencing to who expresses the national outlook (2006: 155-60). 
Whether referring to its argument as unwilling to acknowledge anything has changed 
(2006: 155) or its style as expressing a ‘sense of superiority’ and ‘cool intellectual 
confidence’ (2006: 155) there are not references to expressions of this view other than an 
article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine. This means it is not possible to test the fairness of 
Beck’s representation.  
 
Beck summarises criticisms of cosmopolitanism and advocacies of the national outlook 
as ‘protectionism and nostalgia, postmodernism, indifference, cynicism, or at best irony’ 
(2006: 161). However this leaves out a more sophisticated position, which recognises 
global and international forces but sees them as embedded in and inseparable from 
nation-states. This view is not of protectionism or isolationism (although there are 
significant instances of these in world politics), postmodernity, or a globalism which is 
beyond the national outlook. It involves a globalism or internationalism which is 
embedded in nation-states or, to put it the other way round, a nation-state outlook which 
recognises nation-states as integrated into international or global systems. 
 
Beck criticises this internationalist variant of the national outlook for being too national. 
But the internationalist view is not dissimilar to his of global regimes embedded in 
national state compositions of them, alongside the continuing existence of national states 
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and societies (2006: 158-9). Beck’s concept of the role of the nation and nation-state in 
the global era has commonalities with what he describes as the internationalist version of 
the national outlook. In effect he affirms the internationalist national outlook which he 
has said is redundant in a second age of modernity.   
 
Beck’s arguments come back to an acknowledgement of the role of the state and power in 
global configurations. He argues that streams and networks outlined by authors like 
Castells (1997) are not independent of national, transnational and political-economic 
structures. Social science should shift from such latter entities to networks (2006: 80) but 
national spaces and their institutional manifestations remain the centres of structuring 
power. Beck says that streams are processes which are promoted or inhibited by the 
agency or impotence of particular groups of actors and that the stream metaphor can 
mislead us into neglecting analysis of relations of power. He reintroduces a model of 
states and power in networks which conflicts with his model of global cosmopolitan 
politics that dismisses the national outlook.  
 
In discussing political responses to globalisation Beck lists ten. Two are international or 
transnational, but with nation states as basic units. The other eight are not inherently 
transnational, and are as likely to be pursued by national governments (2000: ch 5). His 
discussion is coloured by the German social market experience, which adds to the 
national dimension to these responses to globalisation. This goes against a cosmopolitan 
or global perspective normatively. Beck’s proposals are at a level where national 
responses are important. This is rightly so because national states are significant, and 
some of the most critical and powerful arguments Beck makes are at the level of national-
political responses to global neoliberalism. But it belies the argument about the second 
age of modernity and normative proposals needing to be post-national, cosmopolitan and 
transnational.  
 
A first response that Beck recommends is international co-operation between nation-
states to limit global firms’ ability to escape tax obligations and to pursue a regulatory 
framework, for example through bodies such as the EU, G7, OECD, IMF, or WTO. He 
says this does not involve a supranational mega-state or world state but a closing of ranks 
amongst national states (2000: 131) to stop TNCs playing countries off against one 
another. It renews political influence, and could modernise and revive social democracy 
via international cosmopolitan forms (see also, for instance, Held, 2004; Martell et al eds, 
2001; Jacobs et al 2003). While called cosmopolitan democracy this is inter-national, 
based on nation-states collaborating rather than a global state which is supra- or above 
and beyond national states. The national state is outward looking and collaborationist on 
an international level and the focus is still on the nation-state and not a post-national age.  
 
A second response to global neoliberalism is the transnational state or inclusive 
sovereignty. Here nation-states are still the essential units. Beck says this proposal is for 
interstate collective action. What is proposed is said to be not international, multilateral 
or multi-level, all of which take the nation-state as a point of reference, but interstate 
alliances in a new form of state. Sovereignty is developed beyond the national level, for 
instance in European wide initiatives. Exclusive sovereignty switches to inclusive 
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sovereignty. Here there is something which is post-national and supra-national. But it is 
composed of national-states and allows them to ‘regain their capacity for action and their 
power to shape events … renew their sovereignty within the frame of world society … 
national players win political room to shape events … through transnational cooperation’ 
(2000: 133-4).  So it goes beyond the international to the supra-national but is constituted 
by nation-states in which their power is revived.  
 
The other eight responses to global neoliberalism that Beck outlines involve state policies 
to counteract the effects of globalisation. These could be pursued at national or 
transnational levels – workers’ social ownership, investment in education and training for 
the knowledge society, consumer power, strengthened civil society activity, new forms of 
production and markets, and recognition of social exclusion. As well as being applicable 
to national as much as transnational states, they are policies which could be responses to 
globalisation or relevant if there was not globalisation. Some are aimed at specific 
conditions in one nation, Germany, reinforcing the significance of national differences in 
a globalized world.  
 
Beck concludes his discussion of strategies by saying that economic development escapes 
the reach of national politics whereas resulting social problems can be tackled within the 
safety-net of the national state. He adds that a world state and world system of social 
security are not impending. But Beck has advocated policies on economic development 
for a particular national context which could be enacted by a national government (and 
have been in some cases). This undermines his case that economic development escapes 
the reach of national politics. And he says that social security is for national governments, 
so stating a place for the national government in what he has elsewhere argued is a post-
national epoch.  
 
Issues here are characteristic of other of Beck’s arguments that I have discussed in this 
article. There is a tension between outlining what it is said can only be global and then 
saying the same things are national, or vice-versa. And there is the common sequence of 
stating arguments of a post-national nature and then inserting qualifications that 




Beck has tried to avoid neoliberal and postmodern responses to globalisation and to see 
the importance of the global level. He has attempted to find social and humanitarian paths 
transnationally, rather than bowing to neoliberalism or retreating from politics. The 
importance of looking for ways down this path should not be underestimated.  
 
But there are flaws in Beck’s work in this area, and some are exposed by contradictions 
in his arguments. He separates out spheres of globalisation. Economic globalisation 
(globalism) is separated from globality (world society) and globalisation (the process) so 
that the latter two are not reduced to economic determinism. But the consequence is that 
an analysis of economic globalisation does not get carried through to prescriptions for 
global politics where, consequently, issues of economic interests, power and inequality 
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are left out. What remains is an optimistic picture of communalism in global politics. The 
national outlook and a role for the state is left out by Beck in a desire to establish a 
globalist outlook, with the consequence that state power, and interests and ideologies in 
state politics, are not seen as bases for global politics around which strategies need to be 
geared, as many of his concrete prescriptions suggest. Instead a benign co-operative view 
of cosmopolitan politics is outlined, so much so that the US under the Bush Presidency is 
seen as a force for democratic humanism rather than geopolitical interests.   
 
Some flaws in global cosmopolitan politics are evident in qualifications and 
inconsistencies in arguments for it. Beck draws attention to conflict, inequality, power 
and the role of the state in global politics. But he does so as a qualification or clarification 
to a picture of global cosmopolitanism rather than as structuring principles which 
undermine global cosmopolitanism. Where cosmopolitanism and conflict are both seen 
Beck tends towards the former.  
 
The basis of an analysis of global politics can be found in Beck’s outline of state 
reactions to global neoliberalism. These contain strategies to counteract the power of 
capital and pursue the interests of labour, welfare and social goals. In concrete analysis of 
the localisation of global neoliberalism and how it may be counteracted his focus is on 
policies and levels other than global communalism, in a context of conflicting interests 
and diverging ideologies in which he takes some sides over others, the social democratic 
state and welfare over capital and neoliberalism. Here global cosmopolitan communalism 
does not seem the most promising basis on which the approaches he advocates could be 
pursued. Beck is at his strongest in analyses which recognise inequality, power and 
conflict, which cause problems for cosmopolitan globalism, and it is with the power of 
these analyses that Beck should be returned to. Continuation of an analysis along such 
lines at a global level might see the basis for global politics in movements such as the 
global justice movement or anti-neoliberal state politics in, for instance, Latin America. 
In such instances politics is international but on the basis of multilateral alliances in a 
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